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Abstract
Over the past six decades, fertility rates fell dramatically in most middle-
and low-income countries. To analyze these developments, we study a quanti-
tative model of endogenous human capital and fertility choice, augmented to
allow for social norms over family size. We parametrize the model using data
on socio-economic variables and information on funding for population-control
policies aimed at affecting social norms and improving access to contracep-
tives. We simulate the implementation of population-control policies to gauge
their contribution to the decline in fertility. We find that policies aimed at al-
tering family-size norms accelerated and strengthened the decline in fertility,
which would have otherwise taken place much more gradually.
Key words : fertility rates, birth rate, convergence, macro-development, Malthu-
sian growth, population policy.
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1 Introduction
Over the past six decades, most developing countries experienced remarkable de-
clines in total fertility rates (TFR). The world’s average TFR declined steadily,
falling from an average of 5 children per woman in 1960 to an average of 2.5 in 2015.
This decline in fertility is not skewed by the experience of a few countries. In 1960,
more than half of the countries in the world recorded average fertility rates greater
than 6 children per woman. By 2015, the median TFR was 2.2 children per woman.1
These large declines in fertility took place in most regions of the world despite
widely varying levels of development (see Figure 1). More specifically, the relation-
ship between fertility and development (as measured by GDP per capita) has shifted
downward and become flatter. The size of the downward shift has amounted to an
average of 2 children per woman, implying that today a typical woman has 2 fewer
children than a woman living in a country at the same level of development in 1960
(de Silva and Tenreyro 2017). The time series of average fertility and income for
developing countries further highlights the rapid transition - by 2014, the average
fertility is much lower than would have been predicted by the average incomes in
the cross-sections of 1960. That is, developing countries have, on average, reached
fertility levels similar to that of developed countries at much lower average income
levels (see Figure 2).2
De Silva and Tenreyro (2017) have argued that while socioeconomic factors
played an important role in the worldwide fertility decline, the timing and speed
of the fall over the past decades suggest that the population control policies imple-
mented in many developing countries over this period played a significant role in
accelerating the process.3 The design of population-control programs consisted of
1See Appendix A for data on the change in fertility between 1960 and 2015 by country.
2Recent work by Delventhal, Fernandez-Villaverde and Guner (2017) study the demographic
transitions in 188 countries and find that transitions have, indeed, grown faster over time, starting
from higher birth rates and lower levels of income.
3A number of socioeconomic factors have been cited as possible causes for low fertility, includ-
ing higher income, lower mortality, increasing investments in education, and rising female labour
force participation (see Manuelli and Seshadri (2009), Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2010),
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Figure 1: Fertility trends by region
Source: de Silva and Tenreyro (2017) using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database
two main parts. The first was the diffusion of contraceptive supply and information.
The second was the implementation of public campaigns aimed at reversing pro-
natalist attitudes and establishing a new small-family norm. One of the inferences
drawn from our study is that the second strategy of employing public campaigns to
reduce desired levels of fertility was critical in complementing contraceptive provi-
sion. The exact size of the effect, however, is not easy to gauge from the empirical
evidence, as endogeneity impedes a clean causal inference.
In this paper, we study a model of endogenous fertility and human capital accu-
mulation, building on the Barro-Becker framework of fertility choice, incorporating
human capital investment (see Barro and Becker 1989; Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor
and Moav, 2002; Moav, 2005). We augment the model to include a role for en-
dogenously evolving social norms on family size. The model allows us to analyze
the factors underpinning the fertility decline observed in developing countries and
quantify their causal contribution, circumventing the challenges faced by reduced-
and Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) for some recent examples). Focusing on the fertility decline in
developing countries, de Silva and Tenreyro (2017) report that different measures of the intensity
of family planning programs are strongly and positively associated with fertility declines, even after
controlling for changes in a wide range of such covariates.
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Figure 2: Fertility-Income relationship
Source: Updated from de Silva and Tenreyro (2017) using data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database. The graph plots the TFR-GDP per capita relationship for a cross-section of countries from 1960 and 2014
(the lowess smoothed functions are given by the solid and dash-dot lines) and the time series of average fertility and
GDP per capita for developing countries from 1960 to 2014 (dashed line).
form estimations.
In the model, individuals derive utility from both the quantity and “quality” of
children and dislike deviating from the social norm on the number of children.4 Our
modelling of adherence to social norms borrows from the literature on social distance
and conformity (Jones 1984, Akerlof 1997) so that individuals derive disutility from
a function of the distance between their realized fertility and the social norm.5
The definition of the family-size norm builds on the sociology and demography
literature, where the norm is influenced by the size of the family of origin or relevant
reference groups.6 As such, the norm is portrayed in the model as an evolving
4We follow the literature’s jargon, where “quality” relates to the level of human capital of the
individual.
5We deviate from the existing work on the impact of social norms on fertility in how we model
social norms. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016), Munshi and Myaux (2005), Manski and Mayshar
(2003), Palivos (2001) and Bhattacharya and Chakraborty (2012) model norms as the outcome of
strategic decision-making and interaction. We take a simpler specification that is more amenable
to quantification and in line with the literature on external habits or reference dependence.
6See, for example, Clay and Zuiches (1980) for a discussion on the importance of reference
groups in forming fertility norms, Thornton (1980), Murphy (1999) and Kolk (2014), which explore
the impact of parental fertility on fertility outcomes, and Fernandez and Fogli (2009) who find
higher fertility among women whose ancestry is from high TFR countries.
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weighted average between the fertility of the previous generation and the long-term
replacement level of fertility, which we set to be equal to two children per woman.
We choose the replacement level as the second term in the average as this was the
fertility level advocated and promoted by most population-control programs in their
public campaigns.
We calibrate the model’s structural parameters and initial conditions to match
key moments of the data for developing countries in 1960 and use it to simulate the
transition to the steady-state levels of fertility and human capital. We show that
the baseline model, where the only mechanism by which fertility is driven down is
the accumulation of human capital, can endogenously generate only a small decline
in fertility rates. Incorporating social norms into the model generates a faster and
larger decline than that yielded by the model without norms, though that alone is
not sufficient to match the sharp decline observed in the data.
We simulate the effect of population-control policies on family-size norms using
information on funding for family-planning programs. In particular, given that the
majority of the programs advocated having two children, we allow the weight placed
on the replacement level of fertility to increase with the intensity of these programs
and shift the social norm on family size downwards.7 The simulation shows that the
introduction of policies aimed at altering family-size norms significantly accelerates
and strengthens the decline in fertility that would otherwise take place much more
gradually as economies move to higher levels of human capital.
We then consider several alternative mechanisms that might explain the fertil-
ity decline, with the model allowing us to gauge quantitatively the role played by
7The main version of the model assumes that households count with the technology to control
fertility. While the data on family planning funds do not allow a break down of funding used for
increasing contraceptive access and funding used for promoting a smaller family size, what is clear
in the data is that family planning funding per capita is strongly and negatively correlated with
“wanted fertility”rates (as defined in Demographic and Health Surveys), which are likely to reflect
preferences, but uncorrelated with “unwanted fertility”rates, which are more closely (negatively)
related to access to contraception (see Appendix B). This evidence suggests that the effect of family
planning programs operated through a preference-changing channel rather than through the access
to contraception channel.
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the different channels. The first extension explores the role played by the fall in
mortality rates and finds that, in a setting in which there is child mortality and
uncertainty about how many children survive to adulthood, the decline in mortal-
ity alone is not sufficient to explain the fall in fertility observed over the past few
decades.8 The second extension of the model considers the case in which households
cannot fully control fertility rates (contraception technologies are either not avail-
able or imperfect). In that setting, we study the role played by increased access to
contraception (the other main component of population-control policies) and find
that the changing fertility norms have a much larger effect on the fertility decline
than increased access to contraception, consistent with the fact that many of the
family planning programs supplemented their supply-side strategies of increasing
access to contraception with large scale mass media campaigns to promote smaller
family sizes.
We do not explicitly model the possibility that children provide their parents with
transfers in their old age, but our modelling choices can be recast in those terms,
as parents care about their children’s future earning capacity.9 We also abstract
from the analysis of child labor and compulsory schooling policies, such as that in
Doepke and Zilibotti (2005), leaving the joint analysis of these policies together with
population-control policies for future work. In what follows, we describe the model
in more detail, specifying technologies and preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
8This point was previously made by Doepke (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde (2001), and Becker
and Barro (1988). The Becker and Barro (1988) model predicts that when mortality rates decrease,
the total fertility rate falls, but the number of surviving children remains the same. (In other words,
if people’s preferences for the surviving number of children do not change, fertility falls only insofar
as is necessary to achieve the same final target.) In survey data, however, we observe a decline
not only in fertility rates, but also in the desired number of children, that is, a change in the final
target. Cervellati and Sunde (2015) overcome this problem by introducing differential fertility
across education groups, which interacts with increasing longevity, to drive down both total and
net fertility. However, the authors note that while their model captures well the transition of the
European economies, it does not fully capture the acceleration experienced by many developing
countries after 1960. It is precisely this acceleration that our paper seeks to explain.
9There is a growing literature which addresses these inter-generational transfers explicitly (see
for example Boldrin and Jones 2002, Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin 2014, Choukhmane, Coeur-
dacier and Jin 2014).
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Section 3 explains the calibration strategy and describes the data used in the anal-
ysis. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper and Section 5 studies various
extensions of the model. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider an overlapping-generation economy in which individuals live for two
periods: childhood and adulthood. In each period, the economy produces a single
consumption good using as inputs the productive capacity of all working adults
and a fixed factor. The human capital stock is determined by the fertility and
educational choices of individuals. There is also a government, which levies taxes
from households and spends all revenues on education.
2.1 Technology
Production occurs according to a constant returns to scale technology. Using the
specification in Galor and Weil (2000), output at time t, Yt is:
Yt =
[
(H¯ +Ht)Lt)
]ρ
(AtX)
1−ρ, 0 < ρ < 1 (1)
where H¯ +Ht is the productive capacity of a worker, Lt is the working age popu-
lation, X is the fixed factor, and At is the technology at time t, with AtX referring
to “effective resources”. The term H¯ is a physical labour endowment all individuals
are born with and Ht is human capital produced with investments in schooling.
Output per worker at time t, yt, is
yt = ((H¯ +Ht))
ρx1−ρt , (2)
where xt = AtX/Lt is the effective resources per worker at time t.
As in Galor and Weil (2000), we assume that the return to the fixed factor
7
is zero. This assumption helps to keep the model simple so that the only source
of earnings for households is labour income, which is a reasonable description of
households’ funding in developing countries. The factor X can then be interpreted
as a productive public good (e.g., a natural resource) that does not yield private
returns to the citizens. (Galor and Weil (2000)’s interpretation is that there are no
property rights over this resource in the country.)
The return to productive labour, wt, is then given by its average product:
wt =
(
xt
H¯ +Ht
)1−ρ
(3)
2.2 Households
Each household has a single decision maker, the working adult. Individuals within a
generation are identical. Children consume a fraction of their parents’ time. Work-
ing adults supply labour inelastically, decide on their consumption, the number of
children, and their education in period t.
Parents are motivated by altruism towards their children but are conscious of
the social norm on the number of children that a family should have. As such, while
parents derive utility from their children (both the quantity and the quality), they
derive disutility from deviating from the social norm. The utility function for a
working age individual of generation t can be expressed as:
Ut = u(Ct; nt; qt+1)− ϕg(nt, nˆt), (4)
where u is a standard utility function over three goods: Ct, denoting consumption
at time t; nt, which denotes the number of children; and qt+1, which indicates the
quality of children as measured by their future earning potential. Following Galor
and Weil (2000) and Moav (2005), we assume qt+1 = wt+1(H¯ + Ht+1), where wt+1
is the future wage per unit of productive labour of a child, and H¯ + Ht+1 is the
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productive capacity of a child. The factor ϕ > 0 governs the disutility from deviating
from the social norm and g(nt, nˆt) is a function of the deviation of the chosen number
of children, nt, from the social norm on family size, nˆt, where g11(nt, nˆt) > 0;
g12(nt, nˆt) < 0. The first condition implies that movements further away from the
norm involves heavier penalties, while the second implies that the marginal cost of
the additional child is decreasing in the social norm. We model the social norm on
family size as a weighted average between the previous generation’s fertility, nt−1,
and the replacement level of fertility, n∗, so that nˆt can be expressed as:
nˆt = φn
∗ + (1− φ)nt−1, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (5)
The individual’s choice of desired number of children and optimal education
investment for each child is subject to a standard budget constraint. While parental
income is given by wt(H¯ + Ht), we assume that a fixed fraction of income, τ0, is
spent on each child regardless of education and a discretionary education cost for
each child, τ1ht, which is increasing in the level of education, ht, is chosen by the
parents.10 Households also pay a fraction, τg, of their income as tax. The remaining
income is spent on consumption. The budget constraint at time t is therefore,
Ct = [1− τg − (τ0 + τ1ht)nt]wt(H¯ +Ht) (6)
The cost of a year of schooling for a child is a fraction, τh, of income, which is
met through household and government spending on education. This means,
τhnthtwt(H¯ +Ht) = Gt + τ1nthtwt(H¯ +Ht), (7)
10While changes in the gender wage gap could also have an effect on the opportunity cost of child
rearing by altering the woman’s bargaining position in the household (see, for example, Doepke
and Kindermann (2016)), modelling non-cooperative solutions is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, to the extent that female labour force participation reflects some of the female power in
a society, in the cross section of countries, we find no systematic relation between female labour
force participation and fertility rates.
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where Gt is the government expenditure on education in period t.
The government spends all its tax revenue on education and, in equilibrium, runs
a balanced budget, so:
τgwt(H¯ +Ht) = Gt, (8)
Together together with Equation 7, this gives:
τ1 = τh −
τg
ntht
(9)
We assume, for simplicity, that households internalize the government budget.
The household budget constraint can thus be written as:
Ct = [1− (τ0 + τhht)nt]wt(H¯ +Ht) (10)
Following Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) and Ehrlich and Kim (2005), we
specify the human capital production function as:
Ht+1 = zt(H¯ +Ht)ht, (11)
where H¯ +Ht is the productive capacity of the parent, ht is the educational invest-
ment (or schooling) in each child and zt is the human capital production technology.
This specification of productive capacity prevents perfect inter-generational trans-
mission of human capital, allowing for positive levels of human capital even for
children whose parents have no schooling (Ht = 0).
2.3 Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, agents and firms optimally solve their constrained
maximization problems and all markets clear. Let (v) = (H¯ + Ht, nt−1). A com-
petitive equilibrium for this economy consists of a collection of policy functions for
households {Ct(v), nt(v), ht(v)}, and prices wt such that:
10
1. Policy functions Ct(v), nt(v), and ht(v) maximize
u(Ct;nt; qt+1)− ϕg(nt, nˆt)
subject to the budget constraint (6), human capital production function (11),
the law of motion for norms (5), and (Ct, nt, ht) ≥ 0;
2. wt satisfies Equation 3;
3. the government runs a balanced budget, satisfying Equation 8; and
4. The market for the final consumption good clears such that:
Ct = [1− τg − (τ0 + τ1ht)nt]yt
3 Calibration
In the policy experiments that we carry out, we examine the transition of the econ-
omy from a given initial condition to a steady state level of fertility and human
capital investment. Our calibration strategy consists of choosing structural param-
eters and initial conditions so that the outcomes of the model in the first period
match the appropriate moments for consumption, income, fertility, years of school-
ing, spending on education, and population in developing countries in 1960.11 Since
the economic agent in this model is an individual, the fertility rate in the model is
one half of the total fertility rate in the data. We interpret the units of investment in
human capital per child, ht, as years of education. (We ignore integer constraints in
the model and treat bot fertility and years of education as continuous variables; the
empirical counterparts are also not integers, as they are given by the average fertility
11We refer to all countries which were not classified as OECD countries prior to 1970 as de-
veloping countries in the starting period. 1960 is the first year for which cross-country data on
fertility, income and consumption are available.
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and average number of years of education).12’13 A period in the model corresponds
to the length of one generation, which we set to be 25 years.
The data on household consumption, per capita GDP, government spending on
education as a fraction of GDP, population and fertility are obtained from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset while the data on expected
years of schooling are taken from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2013).
3.1 Technology
Estimates of total factor productivity in East Asian countries over the 1966-1990
period by Young (1995) indicate that on average, annual TFP growth over the
period ranged from -0.003 in Singapore to 0.024 in Taiwan. As such, we will assume
a constant annual TFP growth rate of 0.018 which is compounded to obtain the
TFP growth rate between generations, gA. We set the Cobb-Douglas coefficient on
labour, ρ, to 0.66.14 Finally, we assume that there is no growth in the technology
used in human capital production, zt.
3.2 Cost of child-rearing
We use data on the fraction of household expenditure allocated to education re-
ported in household surveys and government expenditure on education to calibrate
the values of τ0 and τh. (See Appendix C for a detailed description of data and
sources.) In our model, the fraction of household expenditure allocated to edu-
cation is represented by τ1ntht. The value for τ1, calculated using corresponding
12The data we use for education is the expected years of schooling of children of school entrance
age obtained from UNESCO (2013).
13The data on expected years of schooling starts from 1980. Therefore, to obtain the average
years of schooling for 1960, we compare the series with years of schooling for the adult population
taken from Barro and Lee (2013). The average years of schooling for the adult population (aged
25+) in our sample of countries in 1985 is 3.67. Since this measure is likely to understate the level
of education of the younger cohorts, we set expected years of schooling for children born in 1960
to be 5.
14Our specification of utility implies that the values of gA and ρ affect the simulations only
through the initial value for the human capital stock and the calibrated value of θ as wages do not
have an effect on fertility or human capital investment decisions.
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values for nt and ht from the data, ranges from 0.1% in Latin America to 0.6% in
Singapore. We therefore set τ1 to its mean value, 0.003.
Government expenditure on education as a share of output is represented in
our model by τg. We combine the average government expenditure on education
as a fraction of GDP in developing countries with the calibrated value for τ1 using
Equation 9 to back out the value for τh.
15
We then use the household budget constraint to back out the value for τ0, the
non-discretionary component of the cost of child-rearing, given the initial levels of
income, consumption, fertility and education.
3.3 Preferences
Following the literature, we assume utility is additively log linear in consumption,
the number of children, the quality of children and social norms:
Ut = lnCt + α lnnt + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]− ϕg(nt, nˆt), (12)
α > 0 reflects preferences for children, θ > 0 for child quality. As noted in Akerlof
(1997), the use of the absolute value of the difference between individual fertility and
the social norm gives rise to multiple equilibria. We use a more tractable functional
form given by:
g(nt, nˆt) = (nt − nˆt)
2,
where individuals derive disutility from deviating both from above as well as below
the social norm and deviations in either direction are penalized symmetrically. In
Section 5, we consider a different functional form which treats upward and downward
deviations asymmetrically and find that the results are very similar.
15Our specification of a fixed value for τh is based on the assumption that household spending
on education is high when government spending is low. While there is insufficient data to check this
empirically for developing countries, it is possible to use data for 39 OECD and partner countries
to show that, once income differences have been controlled for, there is a negative relationship
between private and public education expenditure. See Appendix D.
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Given these preferences, the first order condition for nt is given by:
α
nt
=
(τ0 + τhht)
1− (τ0 + τhht)nt
+ 2ϕ(nt − nˆt) (13)
The first-order condition equates the marginal benefit of having children with the
marginal cost. The first term on the right hand side is the marginal cost in terms
of foregone consumption while the second term will be a cost if the additional child
pushes the total number of children over the social norm.
The first-order condition for ht is:
θzt(H¯ +Ht)
(H¯ +Ht+1)
=
τhnt
(1− (τ0 + τhht)nt)
, (14)
where the right hand side is the marginal utility to the parent from giving her child
an additional unit of education and the left hand side is the marginal cost in terms
of foregone consumption.
Our specification of utility leaves us with three preference parameters (α, θ,
and ϕ) to be calibrated. We also require initial values for Ht and zt. We start by
calibrating a baseline model in which individuals do not care about norms (ϕ = 0)
and pin down α from the first-order condition for nt, using the cross-country macro
data for developing countries for 1960. We use the per capita output growth in the
economy to pin down H¯+Ht+1
H¯+Ht
(which we will refer to as gH , hereafter). We choose
the value of zt, the technology converting schooling to human capital, to match
the empirical estimates of the returns to schooling. Finally, we use the first order
condition for ht and the human capital production function to obtain values for θ,
the preference for child quality, and H1, the level of human capital of parents in the
initial period.16
16Rearranging the human capital production function gives:
Ht = (
1
gH − ztht
− 1)H¯
where gH =
H¯+Ht+1
H¯+Ht
. In order to obtain Ht > 0, it is required that
gH−1
ht
< zt ≤
gH
ht
. Using values
14
3.4 Norms
We use the first order condition for fertility from the full model (Equation 13) to
obtain a value for φ (the weight placed on the replacement fertility rate in the
determination of the norm), for given values of ϕ and nt−1.
17 We do not have
enough moments in the data to back out the coefficient of disutility from deviating
from norms, ϕ, and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical estimates
of this parameter. Therefore, we set ϕ = 0.1 and conduct sensitivity tests using
a range of values for this parameter. While data on fertility rates in developing
countries prior to 1960 is scarce, we set n0 to 3.5 (meaning seven children per
woman - recall that in the model nt is fertility per single-person household) based
on estimates of fertility for several non-European countries in the early twentieth
century provided by Therborn (2004). Finally, the replacement level of fertility, n∗,
is set to 1, reflecting a replacement level fertility rate of 2.
Table 1 summarizes the results of the calibration exercise.
3.5 Estimating the change in φ
We model the role of population-control policies in changing the social norms on
family size by an increase in the weight on the replacement level of fertility, φ. In
order to gauge the value of φ in subsequent periods, we estimate by ordinary least
squares the first-order condition for fertility using data for 2010, holding all other
parameters values (other than φ) constant. In other words, only the weight placed
on the replacement rate of fertility is allowed to change. We model φ as a function
of the intensity of family-planning programs. Specifically, we set φ = φ1P , where P
is family planning program intensity, measured by the logarithm of per capita funds
for gH and ht from the data, we can obtain an upper and lower bound for zt.
The Mincerian return to schooling is given by ρzt
gH
in our model. The value for zt we obtain for a
Mincerian return of 0.11, ρ = 0.66 and the calibrated value of gH falls within the upper and lower
bounds of zt. Therefore, we set zt to 0.47.
17This calibration of φ is based on the assumption that preferences for children are not affected
by preferences about adhering to a social norm on fertility.
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Table 1: Calibration of structural parameters
Value Description/Source
Parameters
ρ 0.66 Productive labour share of output
gA 1.56 TFP growth (Young 1995)
τ1 0.003
Household education spending per child as a frac-
tion of expenditure
gH 2.886
Targeted to match per capita output growth and
population growth
τ0 0.025
Targeted to match household education expendi-
ture
τh 0.006
Targeted to match public expenditure on educa-
tion in 1960
α 0.1987
Targeted to match household consumption-income
ratio in 1960
θ 0.1312
Targeted to match expected years of schooling in
1960
φ 0.204 Targeted to match TFR in 1960
ϕ 0.1
Disutility from deviating from social norm on fer-
tility
n∗ 1 Replacement rate of fertility
Initial conditions
H¯ 1 Labour endowment
n0 3.5
Fertility rates in developing countries in early 20th
century (Therborn 2004)
z 0.474 Targeted to match Mincerian return of 0.11
H0 0.935
Obtained from human capital production function,
given gH
Notes: The table reports the calibrated parameter values and initial conditions and the sources from which they
are obtained.
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for family planning, with the data on family planning funds compiled from Nortman
and Hofstatter (1978), Nortman (1982), and Ross, Mauldin, and Miller (1993). This
gives rise to the following estimable equation:
α
nt
−
(τ0 + τhht)
1− (τ0 + τhht)nt
− 2ϕ(nt − nt−1) = 2ϕφ1P (nt−1 − n
∗) (15)
We estimate the equation using data on fertility and expected years of schooling
for 2010, and the average value of per capita funds for family planning over the 1970-
2000 period. Ideally, P would be the total spending per capita on family planning
programs over this period. However, given that for many countries we have data
only for one or two years, we use the average per capita funding over the period
1970-2000. Note that this exercise is an attempt to recover a numerical estimate for
φ which can be used in the quantitative analysis, rather than to establish a causal
link between the family planning programs and fertility.
The estimation of Equation (15) provides us with a value for φ1. We find that
the estimated coefficient (corresponding to 2ϕφ1) is significantly different from zero
and that the obtained value has the expected sign and magnitude (see Table 2).18
We calculate φ at the sample average of total spending, P , to obtain a value of 0.62,
which shows that the weight on n∗ has tripled over the past fifty years.
4 Results
The dynamics of fertility and human capital accumulation in the economy are gov-
erned by Equations 5, 11, 13, and 14.19 We use the calibrated model to investigate
how the two channels in our model, human capital accumulation and the presence of
social norms on fertility, contribute to the fertility decline. We begin from an initial
level of human capital stock and fertility and examine the transition to a steady
18This also indicates that our choice of 0.1 for ϕ is not unreasonable.
19Note that since neither first order condition depends on wt, the production side of the economy
doesn’t affect the dynamics of fertility and human capital.
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Table 2: Estimation of φ
Parameter Value
φ1 0.167
(0.000)
φ (= φ1P¯ ) 0.626
Observations 53
R2 0.699
Notes: The table reports the results from
estimating Equation 15. The estimation is
carried out using data on fertility and years
of schooling for 2010, and the average an-
nual per capita spending on family planning
over the 1970-2000 period. φ is calculated
as φ = φ1P¯ , where P¯ is the sample average
of per capita spending on family planning.
The value in parentheses is the p-value of
the regression coefficient from which the
value for φ1 is backed out and is based on
robust standard errors.
state.
We start by analyzing a baseline model in which individuals do not care about
social norms (ϕ = 0) and the only mechanism by which fertility falls is the faster
accumulation of human capital. We compare this model with our extended model
of fertility and social norms. We consider two cases: in the first case, φ remains
unchanged over time; in the second case, φ rises to the value estimated in the
previous section (referred to as the model with policy changes). Since the estimated
values are for 2010, we set φ in 1985 to be in between the values of the initial
calibration for 1960 and the estimated value for 2010. We do not impose any changes
to the parameters after the third period.
Figure 1 shows the model’s predicted path of TFR and investment in education
(measured in years of education) under the different versions outlined above. The
corresponding values in the data (only available for the first three periods for fertility
and education) are marked by crosses.
The baseline model (given by the dash and dot line), in which individuals do not
care about norms, generates a small decline in fertility. TFR falls to 4.8 in t = 2 and
reaches a steady state value of around 4.4 children per woman while investment in
18
Figure 3: Transition to steady state
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education for the different versions of the model.
The dash and dot line corresponds to the baseline model where ϕ = 0. The dashed line represents the case where φ
and ϕ remain unchanged over time, while the solid line represents changes in φ to 0.4 and 0.62 at t = 2 and t = 3,
respectively. The points marked by “+” refer to the values observed in the data where t = 2 is 1985 and t = 3 is
2010.
education rises to 7 years of schooling in t = 2 and reaches a steady state of roughly
8.2. The inclusion of social norms on fertility generates a larger decline in fertility
in the long term, even when φ remains unchanged, though this decline occurs at
slower pace. In this case, TFR falls from 6 children per woman to 3.4 within six
generations and a steady state of 2.9 is reached after approximately twelve periods.
At the same time, human capital investment reaches a steady state of around 13
years of schooling. The existence of endogenously evolving social norms on fertility
is enough to generate a decline in fertility which is much larger than the decline
generated by the baseline model.
We next consider the effect of the population control policies (given by the solid
line), which we interpret as an increase in φ. As can be expected, the increase in
φ (a larger weight placed on the replacement level of fertility) generates a much
larger decline in fertility, increase in education and a quicker convergence to the
steady state. We allow φ to rise from 0.2 in t = 1 to 0.4 and then 0.62 in the
two subsequent periods, which corresponds to a change in the norm on number of
children from 6 children in the initial period to around 3 by t = 3. Accordingly, the
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model predicts a decline in TFR to 3 at t = 3 and fertility reaches a steady state of
around 2.4 after eight periods. At the same time, years of schooling rises from 5 to
12 in just three generations.
Comparing the results of the model with the data indicates that the inclusion of
social norms with an increase in φ over time improves the predictions of fertility and
the number of years of schooling considerably. The model is able to replicate the
patterns for both fertility and years of schooling in the second period very well; in
the third period, both model-generated variables fall just slightly above the data. In
particular, the predicted steady state level of fertility is very close to the currently
observed level of fertility. Note that we do not allow φ to change after t = 3. If we
allowed φ to increase continuously over time, convergence to a steady state fertility
rate of two children per woman would be even faster.
The changes in φ which would be required to exactly match the data would be an
increase to 0.5 in t = 2 and then to 0.85 by t = 3. While we estimate the change in φ
captured by spending on family planning programs, it is likely that when taking into
account other factors such as increased access to mass media and modernization,
the actual increase in φ is larger than that estimated in this paper.
To summarize, this quantitative exercise points to the importance of changing
social norms on family size for the decline in fertility observed in developing countries
over the past few decades. We use data on family planning program funds to capture
the change in social norms brought about by these programs which were widely
adopted in developing countries during this period. The results suggest that the
change in social norms brought about by these programs considerably accelerated
the fertility decline. This is consistent with empirical studies that find evidence
of the effectiveness of public persuasion measures in reducing fertility (La Ferrara,
Chong and Duryea 2012 and Bandiera et al. 2014).
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4.1 Individual country simulations
As an additional test, we now apply the model to individual countries for which
sufficient data is available. Focusing on countries with at least 10 data points for
spending on family planning programs (the exceptions are the Sub-Saharan countries
for which fewer data points are available) as well as data on the other macroeconomic
variables required for calibration, we use a sample of 15 countries. The spending on
family planning programs in these countries range from zero in Benin to $0.93 (in
2005 US dollars) in Indonesia to $3.14 in El Salvador, while the decreases in fertility
between 1960 and 2010 range from 1.2 births per woman in Benin to 4.9 in Tunisia
and Korea.
We then re-calibrate the model, country by country, using country-specific data
on the required macroeconomic variables and country-specific estimates of the Min-
cerian coefficient compiled by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002).20. The only
parameter values that we use from the original calibration are the labour income
share (ρ), the cost of educating a child for a household, τ1, and the technology growth
rate (gA). Since we can no longer use a regression to obtain the individual values to
which φ rises, we simply back it out from Equation 15 using data on fertility and
years of schooling for each of the 15 countries for 2010.21
Using the re-parametrised model, we simulate the path of fertility for each of
the 15 countries. The plots in Figure 4 show the model’s predictions together with
the data. As the Figure illustrates, the model does reasonably well at predicting
a significant part of the fertility decline in most countries, with three key excep-
tions: Thailand, Indonesia and Tunisia. In these cases, the model under-predicts
the decline in fertility indicating that the change in φ (the policy parameter) was
20The results are not so different when we use a flat rate of 11 percent for the Mincerian
coefficient for all countries
21In doing so, three countries (Singapore, South Korea and Thailand) record values of φ greater
than one or less than zero. As such, we impose an upper bound of one and a lower bound of zero
for the calibrated value of φ. The full set of re-calibrated parameters for each country is available
in Appendix E.
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Figure 4: Fertility transitions
Notes: The figure plots the simulated fertility transition for each country against the data (the points marked by
“+” refer to the values observed in the data where t = 2 is 1985 and t = 3 is 2010).
not sufficiently large22.
It is worth noting that the deviations from the model’s predictions are not re-
lated to the level of spending on family planning programs. For instance, Tunisia and
Thailand were countries in which strong government-led family planning programs
were implemented. But so were South Korea and India, where the model performs
remarkably well. The model also does reasonably well at predicting fertility tran-
sitions in the Sub-Saharan African countries, where family planning programs were
introduced much later. It is more likely that when the model deviates substantially
from the data, it does so because spending on family planning programs is an inad-
equate proxy for the effectiveness of the program. Or, in other words, because the
spending data we have does not cover the full effort put on fertility reduction.
It is possible, of course, that there are other confounding factors that played a
role in Tunisia, Thailand and Indonesia (e.g., media spillovers from neighbouring
22In fact, for Thailand, the calibration strategy results in a decrease in φ rather than an increase.
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countries) which we have not been able to pin down with our model. However, in
all, given the data limitations, the model matches the fertility transitions in most
economies quite well.
4.2 Out-of-sample fit
As another means of validating the model’s use in measuring the impact of pop-
ulation policy interventions, we consider the model’s predictions in a completely
different setting - the fertility transition of the advanced Western economies. Given
the absence of population policy interventions in these economies in that period, we
compare the predictions of the model with norms but no policy intervention with
the fertility rates observed in advanced European and North American economies
between 1850 and 1950.23
We start by re-calibrating the model to match the average fertility and years
of schooling in these countries in 1850.24 Historical data on fertility is obtained
from Gapminder.org, data on GDP per capita and population is obtained from the
Maddison Project database (2018) and data on years of schooling is taken from the
Lee and Lee Long-Run Education Dataset (2016). Given that data limitations do
not permit the re-calibration of all parameters, we keep the labour income share (ρ),
technology growth rate (gA), and the fraction of income required to raise a child (τ0)
unchanged from our main exercise. Given the very low level of expected years of
schooling (average years of schooling in 1870 is less than 2), we set public spending
on education to zero (which means τg = 0) and the Mincerian coefficient to 0.2. The
initial conditions and parameter values used for this exercise are given in Table 3.
We then simulate the fertility transition of the advanced economies between 1850
and 1950 using the model with norms but no policy intervention. Figure 5 plots the
predictions of the model against the data.
23We limit the comparison to this period given the developments in the technology of modern
contraceptives such as the oral contraceptive pill during the 1960s and the establishment of the
Population Council and the International Planned Parenthood Federation in the 1950s.
24See Appendix F for the list of countries used for this analysis.
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Table 3: Calibration of structural parameters for out-of-sample exercise
Value Description/Source
Parameters
ρ 0.66 Same as original model
gA 1.56 Same as original model
τ0 0.025 Same as original model
gH 1.446
Targeted to match per capita output growth and
population growth between 1850 and 1875
τ1 0.032
Targeted to match consumption-income ratio of
0.8 in 1850
α 0.2554 Targeted to match TFR of 4.8 in 1850
θ 0.3218 Targeted to match 2 years of schooling in 1850
φ 0.035 Targeted to match fertility rate of 4.9 in 1825
ϕ 0.1 Disutility from deviating from fertility norm
n∗ 1 Replacement rate of fertility
Initial conditions
H¯ 1 Labour endowment
n0 2.45 Average fertility rate of 4.9 in 1825
z 0.4315 Targeted to match Mincerian return of 0.2
H0 0.7166
Obtained from human capital production function,
given gH
Notes: The table reports the calibrated parameter values and initial conditions and the sources from which they
are obtained.
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Figure 5: Fertility transition in advanced economies
Notes: The figure plots fertility rates in advanced economies from 1850 and 1950 and the predictions of the model
with norms but no policy intervention. Fertility data on the 22 European and North American countries between
1850 and 1950 are obtained from Gapminder.org.
We find that the predictions of the model, calibrated to match the initial condi-
tions in advanced Western economies in 1850, fits the data well. The predictions are
in line with the slow decline in fertility that took place in these countries during this
period, in which fertility-related policy intervention was minimal. The only part of
the transition the model does not pick up is the rapid decline in fertility observed
during the first half of the twentieth century but given the occurrence of the first
and second World Wars, it is unsurprising that the model cannot replicate fertility
trends during this period. However, the model performs very well for the second half
of the nineteenth century, and its TFR prediction for 1950 is back in line with the
data. The model’s fit with this out-of-sample data confirms, to us, the credibility of
using the model to measure the effect of the population-control policies implemented
in the developing economies.
5 Extensions and robustness checks
In this section we discuss a number of extensions of the model. First, we extend the
model to introduce a role for declining infant and child mortality in the fertility fall.
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Next, we incorporate imperfect control over fertility, to study the role of improve-
ments in contraceptive technologies. Finally, we carry out two robustness checks
which consider the effect of changing the coefficient of disutility from norm devia-
tion, ϕ, and the effect of changing the specification of disutility from deviating from
the norm, allowing upward and downward deviations to be treated asymmetrically.
5.1 Including mortality
The model presented in the previous section did not take into account the mortality
decline observed in developing countries during this period. In this section, we
extend our model to include uncertainty regarding the number of children that
survive to adulthood. We then investigate the impact of an increase in survival
rates on fertility and human capital investment. We follow Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) in
how we incorporate mortality into the model.25
Parents choose the number of children, nt, but only Nt of the infants survive
to childhood and all children survive to adulthood. Parents spend on rearing and
educating their surviving children and derive utility from the quantity and quality of
these children.26 In addition, parents care about how the number of their surviving
children compares with the social norm on family size. The utility function for an
adult of generation t can then be written as:
EtUt = Et lnCt + α lnNt + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]− ϕ(Nt − Nˆt)
2 (16)
where Nˆt = φn
∗ + (1− φ)Nt−1 is the norm on family size.
25In the original Barro-Becker (1989) framework, child mortality is modeled as an explicit cost
of childrearing. Doepke (2005) studies three variations of this model: a baseline model where
fertility choice is continuous and there is no uncertainty over the number of surviving children,
which is contrasted with an extension involving discrete fertility choice and stochastic mortality
and another with sequential fertility choice. He finds that while the total fertility rate falls as child
mortality declines in each model, the number of surviving children increases, and concludes that
factors other than declining infant and child mortality were responsible for the fertility transition
observed in industrialized countries.
26This is a slight deviation from Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) where education is provided before the
uncertainty is realized.
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Expected utility is maximized subject to,
Ct = [1− τg − (τ0 + τ1ht)Nt]wt(H¯ +Ht), (17)
and the human capital production function (11).
As in Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), Nt is a random variable drawn from a binomial
distribution, with st ∈ [0, 1] the survival probability of each infant. We use a second-
order approximation of the expected utility function around the mean value of Nt,
i.e. ntst. The approximated expected utility function is given by:
EtUt = Et


ln[(1− (τ0 + τhht)ntst)wt(H¯ +Ht)]+
α ln(ntst) + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]
−ϕ(ntst − Nˆt)
2 − ntst(1−st)
2
[
(
(τ0+τhht)
(τ0+τhht)ntst)
)2
+ α
(ntst)2
+ 2ϕ]


(18)
which incorporates the budget constraint (17). The last three terms represent the
disutility arising from uncertainty in the number of infants that survive to adulthood.
The first-order conditions for fertility and human capital investment become:
α
nt
(1 +
(1− st)
2ntst
) =
2ϕst(ntst − Nˆt) + ϕst(1− st)+
(τ0+τhht)st
1−(τ0+τhht)ntst
[
1 + 1+(τ0+τhht)ntst
2(1−(τ0+τhht)ntst)
(τ0+τhht)(1−st)
(1−(τ0+τhht)ntst)
] (19)
θzt(H¯ +Ht)
(H¯ +Ht+1)
=
τhntst
(1− (τ0 + τhht)ntst)
[
1 +
(τ0 + τhht)(1− st)
(1− (τ0 + τhht)ntst)2
]
(20)
The key difference between this setup and that in Section 2 is that there is now
an additional term in the marginal cost of both fertility and schooling which reflects
the cost of uncertainty.
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Table 4: Estimation of ϕ and φ with mortality
Parameter Value
φ1 0.141
(0.000)
φ(= φ1P¯ ) 0.558
Observations 52
R2 0.576
Notes: The table reports the results from
estimating Equation 19. The estimation
is carried out using data on fertility, child
mortality rates, and years of schooling for
2010, and the average annual per capita
spending on family planning over the 1970-
2000 period. φ is calculated as φ = φ1P¯ ,
where P¯ is the sample average of per capita
spending on family planning. The value in
parentheses is the p-value of the regression
coefficient from which the value for φ1 is
backed out and is based on robust standard
errors.
5.1.1 Calibration and results
The calibration exercise is carried out in the same way as before - we start from a
model with mortality and no norms to back out all the parameters except φ and then
use the extended model with norms and mortality to get an initial value for φ. We
use the mortality rate for children below 5 years of age (measured as the number of
deaths of children below 5 years of age per 1000 live births) for developing countries
in 1960 (from the WDI database) as a measure of 1− st. The re-calibration causes
τ0, τh, and θ to change slightly (to 0.021, 0.007, and 0.1504 respectively) while φ
changes substantially to 0.02, much lower than 0.2 in the model without mortality.
To identify the change in φ over the past two periods, we carry out the same
estimation exercise as before, again setting φ = φ1P but now using Equation 19.
We see a much larger increase in the value of φ, in both absolute and relative terms,
than in the model without mortality. Table 4 shows the values of the parameters
obtained from the estimation.
We then plot the transition paths of fertility and human capital to their steady
states for three cases: the baseline model with no norms or mortality (given by the
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Figure 6: Incorporating mortality
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the three versions of the model. The
dash and dot line represents the baseline model with no mortality or social norms while the dashed line represents
the baseline model augmented to include mortality where st rises to 0.9 at t=2, and to 0.96 at t=3, where it remains
in all successive periods. The solid line represents the model with mortality and social norms. Here, st rises as
described earlier while φ rises to 0.3 and 0.55 in the second and third periods, respectively. The points marked “+”
refer to the values observed in the data.
dash and dot line), the model with falling mortality rates and no norms (given by
the dashed line), and the extended model of mortality and social norms (given by
the solid line). We allow st to rise over time from 0.77 in t = 1 to 0.90 and 0.96 in
t = 2 and t = 3 as seen in the data. As before, since the estimation of φ is for 2010,
the value of φ for 1985 is set to be in between the values of the initial calibration
for 1960 and the estimate for 2010 and do not change after the third period.
As Figure 2 shows, the incorporation of mortality into the baseline model gener-
ates a slightly larger decline in fertility than the baseline model which only includes
human capital accumulation with TFR converging to around 3.5 births per woman
rather than 3.8. On the other hand, the incorporation of mortality into the baseline
model results in a smaller predicted increase in years of schooling than the baseline.
This is because the decline in the number of surviving children (which is the value
on which years of schooling is determined) is actually larger in the baseline model,
even though the level of fertility is higher (see Figure 3). In the baseline model that
incorporates the mortality decline, the number of surviving children drops from 4.7
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Figure 7: Number of surviving children
Notes: The figure plots the number of surviving children predicted by the three versions of the model. The dash
and dot line represents the baseline model with no mortality or social norms while the dashed line represents the
baseline model augmented to include mortality where st rises to 0.9 at t=2, and to 0.96 at t=3, where it remains
in all successive periods. The solid line represents the model with mortality and social norms, where φ rises to 0.3
and 0.55 in the second and third periods, respectively.
to just 3.4 compared to the decline from 5.9 to 3.8 in the baseline model without
mortality. By contrast, including a social norm that falls over time generates a large
decline in the number of surviving children - a drop from 4.6 to 2.3. Given that the
investment in schooling is made for surviving children, a smaller decline in surviving
children leads to a smaller increase in the years of schooling.
Our modelling of mortality, which is based on Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), generates a
hoarding effect, where the risk of child mortality results in a precautionary demand
for children. The decline in fertility generated by the decline in social norms is
marginally smaller than that in the model described in the previous section because
of this effect. However, the simulations clearly show that it is the presence of chang-
ing social norms that significantly accelerates the fertility fall, indicating that the
mortality transition cannot rule out the role of the population control policies in the
fertility decline. Taken as a whole, we would argue that while the decline in mortality
rates did play an important role in triggering the introduction of population-control
policies, its role in precipitating the fast fall in fertility through individual responses,
without the policy intervention, is less clear.
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5.2 Incorporating unwanted fertility
So far we have simulated the effect of population control policies on the fertility
decline by focusing on their role in changing the norm on family size. We now
extend the model such that individuals do not perfectly control fertility. In other
words, we allow the lack of contraceptive technologies to cause a discrepancy between
the desired and actual number of children.27 This allows us to examine the impact of
a reduction in unwanted fertility caused by the introduction of widespread modern
contraceptives, which was the second main component of the population control
policies.
We do not explicitly model the choice of contraceptive usage (see, for example,
Cavalcanti, Kocharkov and Santos (2017)) but consider individuals’ ability to control
fertility to be exogenously determined. So while the production side of the model is
the same as before, we now assume that parents’ inability to perfectly control their
fertility leads to a distinction between the desired or chosen number of children, ndt ,
and the actual number of children, nat . Specifically,
nat = n
d
t + εt,
where εt is a stochastic error term causing the desired number of children, n
d
t , to
differ from the actual number of children, nat .
Individuals now have to maximize expected utility which, for an adult of gener-
ation t is given by:
EtUt = Et[lnCt + α lnn
a
t + θ ln[wt+1(H¯ +Ht+1)]− ϕ(n
a
t − nˆt)
2], (21)
where Et denotes expectations as of time t.
Individuals maximize expected utility with respect to the human capital pro-
27The key difference between this and the mortality extension is that now individuals face the
risk of overshooting their desired number of children whereas in the case of uncertainty about
mortality, individuals faced the risk of ending up with less children than they wanted.
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duction function (same as before) and the budget constraint, which is now changed
slightly to:
Ct = [1− τg − (τ0 + τ1ht)n
a
t ]wt(H¯ +Ht) (22)
The formulation of the expected utility function requires some distributional
assumptions about unwanted fertility, εt. The data on wanted fertility rates in de-
veloping countries (obtained from Demographic and Health Surveys) indicates that
εt is usually positive and has a positively skewed distribution. We assume that εt
follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ. Thus, a reduction in λ translates to a
reduction in uncertainty as well as average unwanted fertility. We then carry out
a second-order approximation of the expected utility around the mean of unwanted
fertility. Substituting in the budget constraint and human capital production func-
tion, the household problem can be rewritten as:
{ndt , ht} = argmax


ln[(1− (τ0 + τhht)(n
d
t + λ))wt(H¯ +Ht)]
+θ ln[Wt+1(H¯ + zt(H¯ +Ht)ht)]
+α ln[ndt + λ]− ϕ(n
d
t + λ− nˆt)
2
−λ
2
[ (τ0+τhht)
2
(1−(τ0+τhht)(n
d
t
+λ))2
+ 2ϕ+ α
(nd
t
+λ)2
]


(23)
subject to: (ndt , ht) ≥ 0.
The first-order conditions for ndt and ht are given by:
α
ndt + λ
=
(τ0+τhht)
(1−(τ0+τhht)(n
d
t
+λ))
+ 2ϕ(ndt + λ− nˆt)+
λ[ (τ0+τhht)
3
(1−(τ0+τhht)(n
d
t
+λ))3
− α
(nd
t
+λ)3
]
(24)
θzt(H¯ +Ht)
(H¯ +Ht+1)
=
τh(n
d
t + λ)
(1− (τ0 + τhht)(ndt + λ))
+ λ[
τ1(τ0 + τhht)
(1− (τ0 + τhht)(ndt + λ))
3
] (25)
where the last term on the right hand side in Equation 25 reflects the cost of uncer-
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tainty. Since parents derive utility from all children (unwanted or not), the second
line in Equation 24 reflects the cost of uncertainty adjusted for the gain in utility
caused by having an extra child.
5.2.1 Calibration and results
The calibration strategy follows the same procedure as the main model, leaving pa-
rameters α, θ, τ0, τ1, gH , ρ, and n
∗ and the initial conditions unchanged. However,
φ needs to be re-calibrated using Equation 24 for given values of ϕ and λ. The pa-
rameter λ is chosen using data on wanted fertility rates obtained from Demographic
and Health Surveys which start in the late 1980s. Unwanted fertility (calculated as
the difference between TFR and wanted fertility rate) is around 1 birth, on average,
in the 1980s. Since this is well after the introduction of the oral contraceptive pill
and the implementation of many family planning programs worldwide, we set initial
λ to 1 (reflecting an average of 2 unwanted births). We then use Equation 24, to
obtain the value of φ, with ϕ set to 0.1 as before. This gives us φ = 0.22 which is
very close to the value obtained in the main model. As such, we allow φ to rise to
the same levels estimated in Section 3.5.
We then consider two policy experiments using this model: one in which social
norms on fertility and unwanted fertility both change and one in which only social
norms change. In other words, we allow the weight on the replacement level of
fertility, φ, to rise in both versions but allow unwanted fertility, λ, to fall only in
one. The fall in λ reflects the increased contraceptive prevalence over the past
few decades. Using the data on wanted fertility we allow λ to fall from 1 in the
first period to 0.55 in the second, 0.31 in the third and then remain at 0.31 in all
successive periods. Figure 8 plots the two transition paths.
As seen in Figure 8, both channels play a role in the fertility decline. However,
it appears that a large portion of the decline can be explained by the change in
social norms alone. The simulations indicate that the change in norms brings down
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Figure 8: Incorporating unwanted fertility
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the two models. The solid line represents
the model where both social norms and unwanted fertility change while the dashed line represents the model where
only the social norm changes. In both models φ rises to 0.4 and then 0.62 in the second and third periods. In the
model where unwanted fertility also changes, λ falls from 1 in the first period to 0.55 in the second, and 0.31 in the
third, where it remains in all successive periods. The points marked by “+” refer to the values observed in the data.
fertility from 6 children per woman to 3.4, which is more than 85 percent of the
decline predicted by the model where both unwanted fertility and social norms
change. The change in social norms accounts for less of the increase in years of
schooling but still accounts for 75 percent of the total increase predicted by the
model where both parameters change.
The comparison between the two models indicates that changing the norms on
fertility has a much larger effect on fertility decisions than merely increasing access
to contraception. This is consistent with the fact that many of the family planning
programs supplemented their supply-side strategies of increasing access to contra-
ception with large scale mass media campaigns to promote smaller family sizes. This
point was made by demographers Enke (1960) and Davis (1967) at early stages of
the global population control movement, and later by Becker (1992), who argued
that family planning programs focused on increasing contraceptive usage are effec-
tive only when the value of having children is lowered. The result is also consistent
with Cavalcanti et al. (2017), who find that aggregate fertility is unresponsive to
improved contraceptive access even though there are significant compositional dif-
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ferences between education groups.
5.3 Sensitivity to choice of ϕ
In all of the simulations we carried out, the value of ϕ, which measures how much
individuals dislike deviating from family-size norms, was set to 0.1 given the lack
of sufficient moments in the data. We now consider the sensitivity of our results to
this choice of ϕ by redoing the computations for ϕ = 0.05 and for ϕ = 0.5. For each
case, we re-estimate the value of φ for subsequent periods using Equation (15).28
Table 5 presents the new estimates for φ for the different values of ϕ. The
regression results show that the change in ϕ is compensated by the change in φ,
though the estimated changes are small. For instance, the change in φ when ϕ = 0.5
is slightly smaller than the change when ϕ = 0.05. As before, we use the re-estimated
values of φ for the third period and set φ in the second period to an in-between value.
Table 5: Estimation of φ
Value
Parameter ϕ = 0.05 ϕ = 0.5
φ1 0.18 0.16
(0.000) (0.000)
φ (= φ1P¯ ) 0.66 0.59
Observations 53 53
R2 0.532 0.837
Notes: The table reports the results from estimating Equa-
tion 15 for different values of ϕ. The estimation is carried
out using data on fertility and years of schooling for 2010,
and the average annual per capita spending on family plan-
ning over the 1970-2000 period. φ is calculated as φ = φ1P¯ ,
where P¯ is the sample average of per capita spending on
family planning. Values in parentheses are p-values of the
regression coefficients from which the values for φ1 are
backed out and are based on robust standard errors.
The transition paths of fertility and investment in human capital to their steady
state values under the alternative values for ϕ are plotted in Figure 9. The figure
28Using the values of φ estimated in Section 3.5 rather than these re-estimated values has hardly
any effect on the results.
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Figure 9: Alternative values for ϕ
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the full model under different values
of ϕ: 0.05, 0.1 and 0.5, corresponding to the dashed, solid and dash-dot lines respectively. For each variation, phi
starts from the same initial value but follows a different path. When ϕ = 0.1, φ rises to 0.4 and then 0.62 in the
second and third periods. When ϕ = 0.05, φ rises to 0.4 and 0.66, and when ϕ = 0.5, φ rises to 0.4 and 0.59. The
points marked by “+” refer to the values observed in the data.
shows that the results do not vary much in response to ϕ; the transition path for the
first three periods is virtually the same under all three scenarios. The key difference
is in the steady state values to which fertility and schooling converge. The higher the
coefficient of disutility from deviating from social norms on fertility, the lower the
steady state level of fertility and the higher the steady state investment in human
capital. However, moving from ϕ = 0.05 to ϕ = 0.5, a tenfold increase, results
in a reduction of the steady state fertility level of less than 0.5. Furthermore, the
fertility decline generated is still much larger than in the baseline model with no
norms. Carrying out the simulations for the different values of ϕ under the same
path for φ (as estimated in Section 3.5) shows a nearly identical picture. It does not
appear, therefore, that our results are too reliant on the assumed value of ϕ.
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5.4 Functional form of disutility from deviation from the
norm
We now consider the robustness of our results to an alternative specification for the
disutility from deviating from the norm. In particular, we now use a functional form
that treats upward and downward deviations from the norm asymmetrically with
deviations below the norm being penalized more heavily than deviations above. This
would be consistent with societal norms in developing countries where not having
children is considered taboo. For this purpose, we set:
g(nt, nˆ) = [ln(nt/nˆt)]
2
The first order condition for fertility changes to the following:
α
nt
=
(τ0 + τhht)
(1− (τ0 + τhht)nt)
+ 2ϕ
1
nt
ln(nt/nˆt) (26)
while the first order condition for human capital investment remains unchanged.
Under the same parameter and initial condition values as in the previous section,
we plot the transition paths of fertility and investment in human capital to their
steady state values. We consider two experiments: one in which φ increases and
the other in which φ remains unchanged over time. We compare the results of this
model with the results of the main model with quadratic disutility from deviating
from the norm.
The results show that the two functional forms yield results that are very similar.
The decline in fertility is slightly smaller in the log disutility version (corresponding
to the dotted line) with and without the policy change, reflecting the larger penalties
for deviating below the norm. Given the slightly lower predicted fertility rates, the
years of schooling predicted by the log disutility version are marginally closer to the
data than those predicted by the quadratic disutility model.
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Figure 10: Comparing functional forms
Notes: The figure plots the path of fertility and investment in education in the full model under two functional
forms: quadratic disutility from norm deviation (main analysis) and log disutility from norm deviation. For each
functional form we consider two experiments: one where φ rises (to the levels estimated in Section 3.5) and the
other where it remains unchanged. The solid and dashed lines correspond to quadratic disutility with and without
policy changes, respectively. The dotted and dash-dot lines correspond to log disutility with and without policy
changes. The points marked by “+” refer to the values observed in the data.
6 Conclusion
We develop a tractable framework that allows us to quantitatively assess the role
played by different mechanisms in the large decline in fertility rates experienced by
developing countries over the past decades. Our framework explicitly models the
influence of population-control policies aimed at affecting social norms and fostering
contraceptive technologies. Population-control policies were put in place by most
countries in the world to lower fertility rates by affecting social norms and increasing
contraceptive use. These policies, however, were often left out of the analysis in
standard macroeconomic models of fertility and development. Our model seeks to
bring those policies into the standard framework and analyze their role together
with those of other determinants of fertility. To do so, we build on the Barro-Becker
framework of endogenous fertility choice, incorporating human capital accumulation
and social norms over the number of children. Using data on a number of socio-
economic variables as well as information on funding for family planning programs
to parametrize the model, we simulate the implementation of population-control
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policies. We consider several extensions of the model to assess the robustness of the
results. The model suggests that, while a decline in fertility would have gradually
taken place as economies moved to higher levels of human capital and lower levels
of infant and child mortality, policies aimed at altering the norms on family size
played a significant role in accelerating and strengthening the decline.
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Appendix A Change in fertility 1960-2015
Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
World 4.98 2.45 2.53 103.25
Afghanistan 7.45 4.80 2.65 55.14
Albania 6.49 1.71 4.78 278.59
Algeria 7.52 2.84 4.69 165.02
Angola 7.48 5.77 1.71 29.69
Antigua and Barbuda 4.43 2.06 2.36 114.49
Argentina 3.11 2.31 0.80 34.71
Armenia 4.79 1.62 3.16 195.07
Aruba 4.82 1.80 3.02 167.63
Australia 3.45 1.83 1.62 88.38
Austria 2.69 1.47 1.22 82.99
Azerbaijan 5.88 1.97 3.91 198.38
Bahamas, The 4.50 1.78 2.72 152.81
Bahrain 7.09 2.06 5.03 244.70
Bangladesh 6.73 2.13 4.59 215.28
Barbados 4.33 1.80 2.54 141.26
Belarus 2.67 1.72 0.95 54.87
Belgium 2.54 1.74 0.80 45.98
Belize 6.50 2.54 3.96 155.50
Benin 6.28 5.05 1.23 24.45
Bhutan 6.67 2.09 4.58 219.75
Bolivia 6.70 2.92 3.78 129.37
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.80 1.35 2.46 182.60
Botswana 6.62 2.77 3.84 138.46
Brazil 6.07 1.74 4.33 248.85
Brunei Darussalam 6.84 1.88 4.95 262.85
Bulgaria 2.31 1.53 0.78 50.98
Burkina Faso 6.29 5.44 0.86 15.73
Burundi 6.95 5.78 1.17 20.27
Continued on next page
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Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
Cabo Verde 6.89 2.37 4.51 190.02
Cambodia 6.97 2.59 4.37 168.58
Cameroon 5.65 4.78 0.87 18.19
Canada 3.81 1.60 2.21 138.19
Central African Republic 5.84 4.94 0.90 18.22
Chad 6.25 6.05 0.20 3.31
Channel Islands 2.42 1.47 0.95 64.47
Chile 5.10 1.79 3.32 185.83
China 5.75 1.62 4.13 255.47
Colombia 6.81 1.87 4.93 263.23
Comoros 6.79 4.42 2.37 53.67
Congo, Dem. Rep. 6.00 6.20 -0.20 -3.24
Congo, Rep. 5.88 4.72 1.16 24.55
Costa Rica 6.45 1.80 4.65 258.39
Cote d’Ivoire 7.69 4.98 2.72 54.56
Croatia 2.29 1.46 0.83 56.71
Cuba 4.18 1.72 2.46 143.14
Cyprus 3.50 1.35 2.15 159.26
Czech Republic 2.09 1.53 0.56 36.60
Denmark 2.57 1.69 0.88 52.07
Djibouti 6.46 2.91 3.55 121.80
Dominican Republic 7.56 2.45 5.10 208.24
Ecuador 6.72 2.51 4.21 167.34
Egypt, Arab Rep. 6.72 3.31 3.41 102.84
El Salvador 6.67 2.10 4.57 217.66
Equatorial Guinea 5.65 4.78 0.88 18.39
Eritrea 6.90 4.21 2.69 63.95
Estonia 1.98 1.54 0.44 28.57
Ethiopia 6.88 4.32 2.56 59.37
Fiji 6.46 2.54 3.92 154.27
Continued on next page
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Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
Finland 2.72 1.71 1.01 59.06
France 2.85 2.01 0.84 41.79
French Polynesia 5.66 2.03 3.63 178.99
Gabon 4.38 3.85 0.53 13.87
Gambia, The 5.57 5.49 0.09 1.55
Georgia 2.94 2.00 0.94 46.88
Germany 2.37 1.50 0.87 58.00
Ghana 6.75 4.04 2.71 66.97
Greece 2.23 1.30 0.93 71.54
Grenada 6.74 2.13 4.62 217.17
Guam 6.05 2.37 3.69 155.68
Guatemala 6.90 3.03 3.87 127.67
Guinea 6.11 4.93 1.18 23.92
Guinea-Bissau 5.92 4.71 1.21 25.71
Guyana 6.37 2.53 3.84 151.46
Haiti 6.32 2.97 3.35 112.71
Honduras 7.46 2.51 4.95 197.49
Hong Kong SAR, China 5.01 1.20 3.82 319.58
Hungary 2.02 1.44 0.58 40.28
Iceland 4.29 1.93 2.36 122.28
India 5.91 2.35 3.55 151.11
Indonesia 5.67 2.39 3.28 137.17
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.93 1.69 5.24 310.85
Iraq 6.25 4.43 1.83 41.22
Ireland 3.78 1.94 1.84 94.85
Israel 3.87 3.09 0.78 25.11
Italy 2.37 1.37 1.00 72.99
Jamaica 5.42 2.03 3.39 167.47
Japan 2.00 1.46 0.54 37.05
Jordan 7.69 3.45 4.24 123.13
Continued on next page
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Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
Kazakhstan 4.56 2.73 1.83 67.11
Kenya 7.95 3.92 4.03 102.86
Kiribati 6.79 3.69 3.10 83.81
Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. 4.58 1.92 2.66 138.37
Korea, Rep. 6.10 1.24 4.86 391.93
Kuwait 7.24 1.99 5.26 264.75
Kyrgyz Republic 5.47 3.20 2.27 70.91
Lao PDR 5.96 2.76 3.20 116.13
Latvia 1.94 1.64 0.30 18.29
Lebanon 5.74 1.72 4.02 233.66
Lesotho 5.84 3.14 2.70 85.78
Liberia 6.41 4.65 1.76 37.76
Libya 7.20 2.31 4.89 211.51
Lithuania 2.56 1.63 0.93 57.06
Luxembourg 2.29 1.50 0.79 52.67
Macao SAR, China 4.77 1.28 3.49 272.81
Macedonia, FYR 3.84 1.52 2.32 152.10
Madagascar 7.30 4.24 3.06 72.13
Malawi 6.94 4.65 2.29 49.38
Malaysia 6.45 2.06 4.39 213.72
Maldives 7.02 2.13 4.89 229.32
Mali 6.97 6.15 0.82 13.38
Malta 3.62 1.42 2.20 154.93
Mauritania 6.78 4.74 2.04 43.05
Mauritius 6.17 1.36 4.81 353.46
Mexico 6.77 2.22 4.55 205.55
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 6.93 3.19 3.74 117.09
Moldova 3.33 1.25 2.08 166.67
Mongolia 6.95 2.79 4.16 148.94
Montenegro 3.60 1.68 1.93 114.85
Continued on next page
50
Continued from previous page
Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
Morocco 7.04 2.53 4.51 178.70
Mozambique 6.95 5.31 1.65 31.08
Myanmar 6.05 2.23 3.82 171.35
Namibia 6.15 3.47 2.68 77.05
Nepal 5.96 2.16 3.80 175.62
Netherlands 3.12 1.71 1.41 82.46
New Caledonia 6.28 2.22 4.06 182.79
New Zealand 4.03 1.99 2.04 102.51
Nicaragua 7.34 2.23 5.11 228.82
Niger 7.45 7.29 0.16 2.25
Nigeria 6.35 5.59 0.76 13.65
Norway 2.85 1.75 1.10 62.86
Oman 7.25 2.74 4.51 164.78
Pakistan 6.60 3.55 3.05 85.92
Panama 5.87 2.54 3.33 131.01
Papua New Guinea 6.28 3.71 2.57 69.27
Paraguay 6.50 2.51 3.99 159.07
Peru 6.97 2.43 4.54 186.99
Philippines 7.15 2.96 4.19 141.65
Poland 2.98 1.32 1.66 125.76
Portugal 3.16 1.23 1.93 156.91
Puerto Rico 4.66 1.43 3.23 225.21
Qatar 6.97 1.93 5.04 261.38
Romania 2.34 1.52 0.82 53.95
Russian Federation 2.52 1.75 0.77 44.00
Rwanda 8.19 3.97 4.22 106.38
Samoa 7.65 4.03 3.62 89.90
Sao Tome and Principe 6.24 4.52 1.72 38.16
Saudi Arabia 7.22 2.58 4.64 179.80
Senegal 7.00 4.84 2.16 44.55
Continued on next page
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Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
Sierra Leone 6.13 4.56 1.57 34.33
Singapore 5.76 1.24 4.52 364.52
Slovak Republic 3.04 1.37 1.67 121.90
Slovenia 2.34 1.58 0.76 48.16
Solomon Islands 6.39 3.91 2.48 63.50
Somalia 7.25 6.37 0.89 13.90
South Africa 6.04 2.49 3.56 143.10
South Sudan 6.72 4.94 1.78 36.11
Spain 2.86 1.32 1.54 116.67
Sri Lanka 5.54 2.06 3.48 168.59
St. Lucia 6.97 1.47 5.50 373.62
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 7.22 1.95 5.27 269.89
Sudan 6.69 4.60 2.10 45.61
Suriname 6.61 2.40 4.21 175.79
Swaziland 6.72 3.14 3.58 113.85
Sweden 2.17 1.88 0.29 15.43
Switzerland 2.44 1.54 0.90 58.44
Syrian Arab Republic 7.47 2.97 4.50 151.75
Tajikistan 6.55 3.40 3.14 92.33
Tanzania 6.81 5.08 1.73 34.00
Thailand 6.15 1.50 4.65 310.35
Timor-Leste 6.37 5.62 0.76 13.44
Togo 6.52 4.52 2.00 44.37
Tonga 7.36 3.68 3.69 100.19
Trinidad and Tobago 5.26 1.77 3.50 198.07
Tunisia 6.94 2.22 4.72 212.28
Turkey 6.37 2.07 4.29 207.24
Turkmenistan 6.59 2.93 3.66 124.84
Uganda 7.00 5.68 1.32 23.18
Ukraine 2.24 1.51 0.73 48.74
Continued on next page
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Country TFR 1960 TFR 2015
Change % Change
1960-2015 1960-2015
United Arab Emirates 6.93 1.77 5.16 292.58
United Kingdom 2.69 1.81 0.88 48.62
United States 3.65 1.84 1.81 98.26
Uruguay 2.88 2.01 0.87 43.50
Uzbekistan 6.26 2.49 3.76 151.10
Vanuatu 7.20 3.31 3.89 117.30
Venezuela, RB 6.62 2.34 4.28 182.61
Vietnam 6.35 1.96 4.39 224.21
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 5.62 1.74 3.88 222.70
Yemen, Rep. 7.49 4.10 3.38 82.46
Zambia 7.12 5.04 2.07 41.14
Zimbabwe 7.16 3.84 3.32 86.60
Notes: The table reports total fertility rate for each country in 1960 and 2015, and the absolute and percentage
change in fertility over this period. The data is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
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Appendix B Family planning funds and wanted
and unwanted fertility
Wanted fertility Unwanted fertility
ln(average funds -0.426*** 0.00556
per capita) [0.145] [0.0589]
ln(GDP per capita) -0.503 0.141
[0.298] [0.105]
IMR 0.0249** 0.00672**
[0.00932] [0.00262]
Urban population 0.0116 -0.00633
% of total [0.0117] [0.00520]
Years of schooling 0.0844 0.0083
of adults [0.0940] [0.0382]
N 37 37
R-sq 0.609 0.149
Source: Authors. Data on total fertility rate, wanted fertility rate, urban popula-
tion, per capita GDP, and infant mortality rate are from the World Development
Indicators. Data on years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013). Data on
funds for family planning are from Nortman and Hofstatter (1978), Nortman (1982),
and Ross, Mauldin, and Miller (1993).
Notes: The table reports the results of regressing wanted and unwanted fertility
(the latter is defined as the difference between total and wanted fertility rates) on
the logged real value of average per capita funds for family planning for the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s, logged GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, proportion of urban
population and years of schooling of the population aged 25 and more. Data on
wanted fertility, which comes from Demographic and Health Surveys, covers dif-
ferent countries in different years, so for each country, we use data from the latest
year for which wanted fertility is available (the earliest observation is from 1987 but
more than 80% of the observations are from after 2000). Since years of schooling is
available at 5-yearly intervals, we replace missing values with data from the closest
year for which data is published.
All regressions include a constant. Per capita funds for family planning are con-
verted to 2005 US$ before averaging. The values in parentheses are robust standard
errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Appendix C Spending on education
Country τ1ntht nt ht τ1 Year Source
India 0.026 1.4 10.5 0.002 2007/08 Tilak 2009
Singapore 0.055 0.6 15.4 0.006 2012/13 Singapore Dept. of Statistics 2014
Sub Saharan Africa 0.042 2.75 8.72 0.002 2001-08 Foko, Tiyab and Husson 2012
Sri Lanka 0.039 1.71 10 0.002 1980/81 Department of Census and Statistics
Sri Lanka 0.056 1.22 13.6 0.003 2012/13 of Sri Lanka 2015
Latin America and 0.019 1.1 13.9 0.001 2010 Regional Bureau of Education for Latin
the Caribbean America and the Caribbean 2013
South Koreaa 0.039 0.61 17 0.004 2012 OECD 2016a, OECD 2016c
Chilea 0.037 0.929 15.1 0.003 2012 OECD 2016a, OECD 2016c
Indonesiaa 0.007 1.22 12.7 0.0005 2012 OECD 2016a, OECD 2016c
Egyptb 0.028 1.6 13 0.001 2010 Rizk and Abou-Ali 2016
Jordanb 0.068 1.85 13.4 0.003 2010 Rizk and Abou-Ali 2016
Sudanb 0.05 2.45 7.3 0.003 2009 Rizk and Abou-Ali 2016
Notes: The table reports the fraction of household expenditure spent on education by households and the backed out value for τ1, which is the
fraction of household expenditure spent per children per year of education using data for different countries and years. The sources for data on
household expenditure on education are given in the last column while data for the corresponding years on fertility, years of schooling, are obtained
from the World Development Indicators and Barro-Lee datasets. Given that years of education are published at 5 yearly intervals, we choose the
closest year for backing out τ1.
aτ1ntht calculated using private spending as a % of GDP and household expenditure as a % of GDP. Private spending on education excludes
expenditure outside educational institutions such as textbooks purchased by families, private tutoring for students and student living costs so pos-
sibly underestimates household spending on education.
bHousehold spending on education is obtained as a fraction of household income rather than expenditure and therefore the obtained values of τ1
are likely to be understated.
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Appendix D Public and private spending on ed-
ucation
Private education expenditure
Public education expenditure -0.12*
(% of GDP) [0.067]
ln(GDP per capita) -0.63*
[0.35]
Observations 113
No. of countries 39
Country and year fixed effects Yes
Notes: The table reports the results from regressing private education expenditure (as a
percentage of GDP) against public education expenditure (as a percentage of GDP), con-
trolling for GDP per capita. Values in brackets are standard errors. The data covers 39
countries over four years. Therefore, the estimated model is a panel regression with coun-
try and year fixed effects.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Data on education expenditure is from the OECD’s Education at a Glance (OECDa 2016)
and data on GDP per capita is from the WDI.
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Appendix E Parameters from country-specific calibration
τ0 τh α θ φ60 φ2010 z H0 gh
El Salvador 0.038 0.005 0.252 0.175 0.935 0.267 0.094 1.663 0.826
India 0.042 0.006 0.242 0.147 0.781 0.231 0.292 0.337 1.843
Pakistan 0.028 0.005 0.178 0.085 0.920 0.157 0.899 0.226 3.911
Tunisia 0.132 0.006 1.186 0.276 1.000 0.904 0.397 0.004 2.584
Turkey 0.065 0.006 0.430 0.154 0.861 0.644 0.465 2.108 2.832
Indonesia 0.140 0.007 0.938 0.231 0.733 0.731 0.558 0.005 3.583
Malaysia 0.077 0.005 0.515 0.155 0.839 0.669 0.586 9.772 4.176
Philippines 0.047 0.005 0.455 0.212 1.000 0.253 0.201 128.393 1.550
Singapore 0.120 0.005 0.697 0.144 0.691 0.000 1.279 151.597 8.380
South Korea 0.000 0.005 0.080 0.150 0.831 0.000 1.021 102.601 9.851
Thailand 0.048 0.003 0.233 0.066 0.829 1.000 0.824 0.041 4.799
Benin 0.035 0.010 0.226 0.227 0.856 0.856 0.265 0.022 1.616
Botswana 0.075 0.008 0.661 0.247 0.923 0.494 3.694 186.758 19.674
Mauritania 0.163 0.006 1.644 0.337 0.955 0.279 0.289 0.256 1.762
Zimbabwe 0.082 0.004 0.587 0.136 1.000 0.178 0.313 3.753 1.909
Notes: The table shows the calibrated values for the parameters and initial conditions for each of the 15 countries.
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Appendix F Advanced Economies sample
Australia Italy
Austria Luxembourg
Belgium Netherlands
Canada New Zealand
Denmark Norway
Finland Portugal
France Spain
Germany Sweden
Greece Switzerland
Iceland United Kingdom
Ireland United States
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